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Abstract
Educational historians, philosophers, and sociologists have long warned that the
increasing encroachment of business logic in public schools bodes ill for democracy
as a way of life. Many have concluded that the business person’s interest in affecting public education is to bring about a greater bottom line, which, of course, is
proﬁt, albeit secured in the name of democratic freedom and social progress. These
scholars have noted that the corporate parasite is eating away the insides of our
public schools and is reproducing its hereditary material (consumer materialism)
within the bodies and souls of its captive hosts: our children. Through corporate
advertisements on school walls, corporate-sponsored curriculum materials and
programs, and corporate-sponsored fundraisers and contests (not to mention the
enormous political inﬂuence corporations have in framing the very aim and purpose of public education), corporations use schools as conduits by which to establish consumption as the ultimate expression of participatory democracy and, thus,
as the supreme good and standard of personal growth. Drawing upon the work of
John Dewey, this paper articulates a conception of democracy and a democratic
theory of education that privileges the social over the private, the public over the
corporate, such that the homo-economicus ideal that our public schools train our
children to aspire to on a daily basis is checked by a wider commitment to the good
life, deﬁned in more socially benevolent ways.

Introduction
Over the past decade, my children along with millions of other children attending
our nation’s public schools have been marketed to in schools more so than at any
other time in the history of public schooling. On any given day, students across the
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country ride to school on buses draped with Coca-Cola ads. They are shown two
minutes of paid corporate advertisement on Channel One (two minutes per day ×
180 school days = 360 minutes or 6 hours of watching corporate advertisement per
year). Some win a personal pan pizza from Pizza Hut’s Book-It program simply for
reading a quantity of books. For those who do not qualify for the pizza award, they
still have the opportunity to buy Pizza Hut pizza, Taco Bell burritos, or McDonald’s
hamburgers in their school cafeterias. Others have the additional opportunity to
wash these food items down with 20 oz. Cokes or Mountain Dews bought out of
hallway vending machines. Later on in the day, some students calculate the area of
Nabisco’s Oreo cookie, while others conduct tests to see if Prego spaghetti sauce is
thicker than its competitors’. Still others, like my own kids, attend Reader’s Digest/
Q.S.P.- sponsored fundraisers set up to entice students to raise much-needed funds
for their “cash-challenged” school. And at the end of the day, many students, textbooks covered with jackets advertising Clairol or Reebok clutched snuggly under
their arms, ride home on Pepsi-bannered buses.
Educational historians, philosophers, and sociologists have long warned that
the increasing encroachment of business logic in public schools bodes ill for democracy as a way of life. Many have concluded that the business person’s interest in
affecting public education is to bring about a greater bottom line, which, of course,
is proﬁt, albeit secured in the name of democratic freedom and social progress.
These scholars have noted that the corporate parasite is eating away the insides of
our public schools and is reproducing its hereditary material (consumer materialism) within the bodies and souls of its captive hosts: our children.1 Through corporate advertisements on school walls, corporate-sponsored curriculum materials
and programs, and corporate-sponsored fundraisers and contests (not to mention
the enormous political inﬂuence corporations have in framing the very aim and
purpose of public education), corporations come to control the particular conditions within schools that feed shared habits and, therefore, command impulse,
need, want, and desire.
How corporations have come to use schools as conduits by which to establish
consumption as the ultimate expression of participatory democracy and, thus, as
the supreme good and standard of personal growth is a complex, richly- textured
tale well documented and better told by others.2 Drawing upon the work of John
Dewey, this paper articulates a conception of democracy and a democratic theory
of education that privileges the social over the private, the public over the corporate, such that the homo-economicus ideal that our public schools train our children to aspire to on a daily basis is checked by a wider commitment to the good
life, deﬁned in more socially benevolent ways. Along the way, this paper underscores the necessity of a democratic education in light of the understanding that
human beings are always in relations of power (effective capacity), the signiﬁcance of which depends upon human perception and judgment of the actual and
potential consequences on the growth of shared habit. Consequently, this paper
stresses the necessity of seeing education as an inherently political undertaking,
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insofar as education refers to the conscious deliberation about and struggle over
valued ends, shared activities, and, thus, forms of power to be fostered or expunged
from collective experience. Since education is concerned with the speciﬁc forms
of community life that should be brought about, an adequate democratic theory of
education demands a careful consideration for the consequences of these forms on
individual growth, which in turn demands an increased sensitivity for expectations
and claims of right intrinsic to these forms. In other words, education inextricably is involved in the struggle over power, over what the “good life” should mean,
over what democracy should mean and how this meaning should be cultivated in
the characters of those who will be entrusted with its realization and direction.
Therefore, this paper emphasizes Dewey’s point that the ideal of democracy can
be realized only to the degree that schools aim to cultivate socially and politically
engaged citizens who are sympathetically and critically responsive to the demand
of democratic justice as it is manifested through the particular activities in which
they take part. Furthermore, it makes the pedagogical point that only by engaging individuals to take up the actual social, economic, and political problems that
affect them in every phase of their lives can an education develop citizens sensitively, intelligently, and responsibly charged enough to struggle over the meaning
of democratic community and to ﬁght hegemonic relations that preclude individual
freedom and social equality.

A Parent’s Problem
In light of the vast technological and social changes accompanying industrial capitalism, particularly as more and more people gained access to consumer goods and
services that were once accessible only by the rich, capitalism spoke to the material needs of the masses and thus, as Joel Spring has pointed out, the development
of human capital became “the most important goal of the educational system in
the twentieth century.”3 As Merle Curti put it in the 1930s, “Educators accepted,
in general, the businessman’s outlook and consciously or unconsciously molded
the school system to accord with the canons of a proﬁt-making system.”4 With the
National Association of Manufacturers reports in 1905 and in 1912 breathing fear
into the public that foreign competitors were advancing on U.S. markets and thus
threatening the American way of life, the conditions were ripe for the business hero
to apply his logic of volume, efﬁciency, and control and his practices of scientiﬁc
management to education and save the highest form of civilization ever achieved by
humankind.5 Consequently, the seizure of school boards and schools by businessmen allowed them to turn public schools into factories processing a standard way
of looking at experience and a standard set of skills necessary to “succeed” in this
experience. For the better part of a century now, schools have manufactured a public
consciousness acquiescent to the needs and demands of a proﬁt-seeking economic
system and generations have been saturated with the belief that one “gets” an education in order to get a good job, which, in turn, will allow one to buy oneself, to
purchase self-respect, personal and collective identity, security, and freedom. With
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schools dying, and warping and weaving students into consumer materialists, all
that was needed was a company store.
Over the past twenty years, businesses have marketed to students inside
schools more than at any other time in the history of public schooling. From Krogersponsored “school-to-work” programs to Reader’s Digest-sponsored “be a good
citizen” fundraisers, from Pizza Hut “read-a-book” incentive program to Exxonsponsored “oil spill good for the . . . environmental science lessons,” from Coke in
the lunch room to Pepsi on the scoreboards, school buses, and schoolhouse door,
the Citicorp-IBM public school has become what Alex Molnar has called an “educational ﬂea market open to anyone who has the money to set up a table.”6 As Deron
Boyles effectively argues in American Education and Corporations, schools serve
as sites for consumer materialism in at least two ways. First, overemphasizing basic-skills training to the detriment of cultivating capacities for critical intelligence
aimed at securing democratic justice, schools reinforce the idea that one “gets”
an “education” solely to generate economic capital, which allows for greater levels
of consumption. Second, through business-school partnerships schools welcome
the marketing of corporate goods, which are portrayed as essential to personal
and social welfare. In consequence, schools reinforce the idea to students that the
production and consumption of goods is the essence of individual happiness and
civic obligation. Business not only has a young, highly impressionable, and captive market but one that, by virtue of schoolhouse training, is “ripe to be gulled,”
one ready and willing to sell all sorts of corporate trinket items, secure in the belief
that one is participating in generating much-needed funds for one’s cash-strapped
school—community service for a common good.
Until my own children started attending public schools, I had considered
the educational aim of cultivating human capital and business-school partnership
practices merely as problems for democracy in theory. However, these theoretical
problems became real problems to me last May when my ﬁrst grader brought home
an “educational” product called Summer Vacation. This self-titled “edutainment,”
produced and marketed by Entertainment Publications Operating Company, included a workbook that could be purchased for $11.99 and a CD, contained in glitzy
packaging with a three-dimensional ﬁgure on the cover, that could be purchased
separately for $18.99. (Software plus workbook could be purchased for $27.99.) On
the back cover of the packaging, the company maintained that the purchase of this
product would ensure that children not lose up to 25 percent of their reading or
math skills during the summer, a possibility that studies (although only one was
cited) reveal can happen. Summer Vacation, the company contends, is a “valuable
investment in your child’s future.” An information sheet accompanying the product
stated that the school and its students may receive special prizes just for participating. This edutainment product is grade-speciﬁc and came home with every child
at the elementary school, a school that has a total enrollment of 695 children, 46.3
percent of whom qualify for the federal free/reduced price lunch program.
Within the prevailing discourse on business-school partnerships, there is
nothing objectionable about this situation. A for-proﬁt corporation is giving back
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to the community by offering a product for purchase designed to enhance a speciﬁc
public good (student achievement). Furthermore, such practices as listed above
constitute a “win-win” solution for the pressing ﬁnancial problems that our public schools face and provide real-world opportunities for students to develop the
habits of mind necessary to be productive citizens of a twenty-ﬁrst century global
marketplace. Since it is primarily through the free market, proponents of businessschool partnerships point out, that individuals concretely express their freedom
to choose, then it is paramount that public schools empower students with the
affections, skills, and intelligence necessary for students to develop themselves as
they see ﬁt within this twenty-ﬁrst-century free market context. Obtaining input,
guidance, and participation from those most successful in this context (business
people) is central and vital to the schools’ mission.
Critics of business-school partnership, however, claim that such partnerships encourage students wrongly to equate consumerism with democracy, thus
strengthening the ideological control that corporations have over the public mind.
Proponents of business-school partnerships assert that market democracy is the
outcome of people expressing and satisfying their needs and desires through economic means. Therefore, market democracy unquestionably remains the most ﬂexible living option for people in the real world. Telling people how they should see
democracy, the proponents say, is itself anti-democratic, contradictory to the very
tenet of freedom of choice, and the luxury of academicians who must feed—and
often do so quite comfortably—at the same trough as everyone else.
The proponents’ response is predictable and saddening. It is predictable because the institutionalization of consumer materialism has become so thorough
that its ideals and standards have become intertwined with the very ﬁber of who
we are as a people. Furthermore, the institutionalization of consumer materialism
through public education precludes the development of critical habits of mind and
civic virtues necessary for a public to take a look at itself. Any criticism of consumer
materialism naturally is resented as an attack upon what is truest and most meaningful about us as individuals and as a public. What more, then, can be expected
than reactionary dismissal? It is saddening because without the ability to take a
look at itself, the public becomes easily hoodwinked. Easily hoodwinked, the public becomes susceptible to forms of insidious power arrangements that nurture individuals’ desires to serve the interest of the few and come to legitimize their own
subjugation as reasonable and natural.

A Deweyan Perspective
As Dewey repeatedly notes, democracy requires not only courageous involvement
but also the honest and open sharing of ideas such that each individual alerts, informs, and enriches the lives of others. To Dewey, the identiﬁcation of power is a
necessary, but not a sufﬁcient, task in releasing individual capacities to expand and
enrich the meaning of the common good. Illuminating the effects of power within
shared activity serves as a beginning, not an end, for a public to form a deﬁnite
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idea of itself. Perception of effects on shared habits is an occasion to exchange and
judge differing ideas, to ﬁll out and correct competing perspectives. It provides an
opportunity for individuals to become conscious of those inﬂuencing associations
of which they are unaware, such that possibilities of growth in interests, desires,
capacities, and resources are suggested and shared. As Dewey maintains, “Democracy is itself an educational principle, an educational measure and policy,” insofar
as education means fostering, cultivating, and sharpening individual capacities
through communication.7 Through the constant give and take of ideas, mere association can tighten into a community in which the activity of each is referred
with interest to the activities of others.
In the broadest sense, then, democracy rests upon the working faith that
community life is inﬁnitely more powerful in securing a just balance between individual freedom and social equality than is any other mode of associated living.
Education serves as the most conscious and surest means by which this faith can
be nourished in principle and birthed as a living power through individual character. As Dewey puts it, “Democracy has to be born anew every generation, and
education is its midwife.”8

A Philosophical Warrant for a Democratic Theory of Education
Every theory of education rests upon philosophical assumptions that provide a
foundational warrant for its normative prescriptions. A brief sketch of the philosophical warrant necessary for a democratic theory of education follows.
According to Dewey’s ontological account, human beings ineluctably share in
concrete activities that yield concrete results. Simply put, shared activities provide
human beings with the fundamental means of living and learning. They are the
essential substances through which individuals acquire and reﬁne their special affections, dexterities, and aptitudes. They are the media by which individuals more
or less develop a sense of the shared goods directing their effective capacities and
of the common standards, expectations, and claims of right by which to judge their
efforts and sharpen their judgments. Fundamentally, shared habit is social power,
the ability to act so as to affect the social environment, the growth and direction
of which depends directly upon the human responsibility to deﬁne and measure
the moral signiﬁcance of its execution. That is, the determination of power (effective capacity) as enhancing or debilitating rests upon some person attempting to
discover and judge the consequences of a particular line of conduct on the growth
of his or her interests, skills, desires, habits, and ways of forming ends and on the
shared arrangements, opportunities, and materials that nourish the active participation and growth of others. Shared habits, therefore, provide the individual
with an intrinsic ideal for conduct that serves as both a good and standard. As the
good or aim of conduct, the ideal refers to the individual’s conscious tendency to
develop his or her particular capacities in harmony with the demands and needs
of others as they develop their own powers. As the standard of judgment, the ideal
refers to the degree to which the individual actually brings about this harmony in
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consequence of acting upon his or her conception of good. Through their attempts
to realize a common good, individuals come to identify new interests and capacities for further growth, as well as additional responsibilities intrinsic to these new
potentials. Thus, shared activity serves as the means by which to realize two principles whose just relation makes up the democratic ideal: individual liberty and
social equality.
Liberty is that secure release and fulﬁllment of personal potentialities
which take place only in rich and manifold association with others: the
power to be an individualized self making a distinctive contribution and
enjoying in its own way the fruits of association. Equality denotes the unhampered share which each individual member of the community has in
the consequences of associated action. It is equitable because it is measured
only by need and capacity to utilize, not by extraneous factors which deprive one in order that another may take and have.9

Again, the growth of an individual’s interests (personal liberty) takes place
within and by virtue of a social environment. Those affected make claims upon
the individual to act in such a way that is considerate of and fair to the full development of others (social equality). Justice, then, refers to the degree of harmony
brought about in consequence of an individual’s growth in relation to the special
demands of others. To the extent that the phrase “the common good” refers to and
is a measure of this harmony, then “the common good” also signiﬁes a measure of
justice at any one given time. As a measure of justice, the common good serves as a
guide for considering broader social claims to fairness and thus for forming a more
thorough idea of the social ends to be served. Dewey puts the matter this way:
The tenor of this discussion is that the conception of common good, of
general well-being, is a criterion which demands the full development of
individuals in their distinctive individuality, not a sacriﬁce of them to some
alleged vague larger good under the plea that it is “social.” Only when individuals have initiative, independence of judgment, ﬂexibility, fullness of
experience, can they act so as to enrich the lives of others and only in this
way can a truly common welfare be built up. The other side of this statement, and of the moral criterion, is that individuals are free to develop,
to contribute and to share, only as social conditions break down walls of
privilege and of monopolistic possession. . . . The criterion is identical
in its political aspect with the democratic ideal. For democracy signiﬁes,
on one side, that every individual is to share in the duties and rights belonging to control of social affairs, and, on the other side, that social arrangements are to eliminate those external arrangements of status, birth,
wealth, sex, etc., which restrict the opportunity of each individual for full
development of himself.10

Variation of social environment and practices, however, cultivates a variety
of interests, valued ends, and habits of attention and judgment. Experience is shot
through with competing judgments over the relative value of power. As Dewey sugVolume 22 (2) ♦ 2006
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gests, social conﬂict is a fundamental datum. In light of all evidence that the growth
and direction of human experience is not determined by any metaphysical absolutes
or necessities, ill will and selﬁshness are just as ontologically possible as goodwill
and altruism. Stated differently, human beings are just as capable of manipulating
each other’s needs, desires, wants, and ways of judgment to serve and legitimize
narrow, selﬁsh ends as they are capable of directing each other to search and act
for ends that appreciate in value and expand the lives of all. According to Dewey’s
philosophical account of human conduct, individuals always should act so as to
stimulate the growth of their own capacities with due care for the particular claims,
needs, well-being, and development of others. This is to suggest that the moral signiﬁcance of any form of power, including business-school partnerships, should be
judged according to the extent to which it expands and enriches the meaning of
individual liberty in just relation to the meaning of social equality.
The quest for an enriched democratic justice requires free-ﬂowing and broad
communication about the consequences of shared activity. Mutual reference and
exchange of ideas is vital for multiplying perceptions of possible resources, sharpening consciousness of shared ends, and stoking the desire to excel beyond existing conceptions of good. Constant vigilance over existing efforts to meet social
demands helps detect conditions that in effect set up unequal relations of power
and that stiﬂe freedom of individual growth. Persistent questioning and shared,
critical inquiry help bring debilitating forms of power that coerce acceptance of
these conditions to the light of social discussion and deliberation. However, the
work of democracy does not take place merely by virtue of collective acceptance
and general appeal to its abstract principles. The work of democracy can be made
concrete, secured, reﬁned, and extended only through the day-in and day-out activities that human beings share. As Dewey suggests, “Only when we start from
a community as a fact, grasp the fact in thought so as to clarify and enhance its
constituent elements, can we reach an idea of democracy which is not utopian. The
conceptions and shibboleths which are traditionally associated with the idea of
democracy take on veridical and directive meaning only when they are construed
as marks and traits of an association which realizes the deﬁning characteristics of
a community.”11
Democracy as a moral ideal, therefore, challenges each individual to be actively engaged with the particular problems that arise within his or her various associations and that limit free and full contact with each other. Only through active
concern for the community of good in which one is a part can problems be immediately felt, understood, and appreciated with sympathy. Only through constant
communication and critical reﬂection about shared ends and purposes, standards,
and the special needs and capacities of all involved can existing efforts to satisfy
social needs be measured, deﬁciencies be identiﬁed, and further work be suggested.
Only when felt problems are communicated can a public form to discuss the value
of existing power and, therefore, suggest and debate what forms of power are worth
promoting or resisting. To deliberate about the forms of power to promote is to
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struggle over what effective capacities should be cultivated. As Dewey suggests, to
struggle over effective capacities is to struggle over what liberty should mean in the
concrete and, by implication, what equality and justice should mean as well.
Liberty is not just an idea, an abstract principle. It is power, effective power
to do speciﬁc things. There is no such thing as liberty in general; liberty, so
to speak, at large. If one wants to know what the condition of liberty is at a
given time, one has to examine what persons can do and what they cannot
do. The moment one examines the question from the standpoint of effective action, it becomes evident that the demand for liberty is a demand for
power, either for possession of powers of action not already possessed or
for retention and expansion of powers already possessed. . . . Demand for
increased power at one point means demands for change in the distribution of powers, that is, for less power somewhere else. You cannot discuss
or measure the liberty of one individual or group of individuals without
thereby raising the question of the effect upon the liberty of others. . . .
Liberty is always a social question, not an individual one. For the liberties
that any individual actually has depends upon the distribution of powers
or liberties that exist, and this distribution is identical with actual social
arrangements, legal and political—and, at the present time, economic, in
a peculiarly important way.12

In the most basic sense, then, to be actively concerned for and engaged in the
struggle for liberty is to take part in the discussion about what kind of community
should be in the making and what sort of citizens are necessary to see it to fruition.
Do we want a citizenry trained to be mere producers and consumers or should we
aspire to more? Can a democracy exist when its citizens view themselves and their
potential through the narrow lens of consumer materialism? Democracy demands,
according to Dewey, nothing more or less than social and political engagement in
the direction of shared experience. An education most ﬁtting to democracy is one
that consciously aims to cultivate “robust trustees of its own resources and ideals.”13
That is, a democratic education must develop citizens with the affections, skills,
intelligence, and virtues (effective habits or powers) necessary to assume social
and political responsibility for themselves and their various communities, not to
be mere cogs in an economic machine. Therefore, democratic education implies a
political education.

A Democratic Theory of Education
As Dewey points out, “The problem of education in its relation to direction of social change is all one with the problem of ﬁnding out what democracy means in its
total range of concrete applications: economic, domestic, international, religious,
cultural, and political.”14 Insofar as democracy entails ﬁnding out what freedom
and equality mean in a just relation with each other, then the ongoing problem of
democratic justice—the problem of equalizing power—gives a general direction
to the aims and methods of democratic education. The problem of justice demands
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that schools cultivate character animated by social interests and sympathy and
guided by social intelligence.
A character animated by social interests and sympathy refers to an individual
who consciously appreciates the inherent social nature of human existence. To appreciate is to feel and understand the quality of something, to sense its goods and
standards. To appreciate the inherent social nature of existence entails the further
recognition that human beings are creatures of acquired habit, the good of which
should be a more reﬁned and controlled interaction with the social environment.
More speciﬁcally, it entails the conscious sense that human beings are living organisms whose life-sustaining activities are directly dependent upon the activities
of others for formation, sustenance, and growth. To appreciate the social nature
of humankind is to understand the fact that the growth of individuals can be secured only as they take in, digest, and replenish the social nutrients that sustain
them. This is to recognize that growth can be realized only as individuals attend
to the particular aims, purposes, and skills of others, as well as to their demands
to realize the good in a way that is considerate and careful of their particular needs
and development. In the most fundamental sense, to appreciate the inherent social
nature of human existence is to understand the basic fact that individual liberty or
freedom to grow always involves the matter of a just relation with others who make
up the social environment and who share in the consequences of growth. It is to
recognize that the meaning of the good always should be a social good, the expansion of which depends upon increasing the range and depth of sympathy one has
for the needs, expectations, and demands of others. As Dewey suggests, “To put
ourselves in the place of another, to see things from the standpoint of his aims and
values, to humble our estimate of our own pretensions to the level they assume in the
eyes of an impartial observer, is the surest way to appreciate what justice demands
in concrete cases.”15 A character motivated by social interests, furthermore, is one
charged by an affection for social well-being and by a “hatred for all that hinders this
well-being.”16 Like all interests, a social interest signiﬁes something active, in this
case an active search for the concrete opportunities that expand and enrich mutual
contact, as well as an active search for the arrangements that preclude, shut down,
and distort free and open communication. By implication, then, a social interest
suggests a special sensitivity for the persistent problems that plague shared activities and a special affection for the “underdog” who suffers most in consequence of
these problems. In the most general sense, a character animated by social interests
has not only an acute feel for the concrete problem of justice but a strong sense of
responsibility for the conduct that causes and changes this problem. A sense of
social welfare, as Dewey implies, induces a sense of responsibility, a sense of the
necessity to know and reﬂect upon the conditions and consequences of conduct.
“The tendency, moreover, of adopting social well-being as a standard is to make us
intellectually sensitive and critical about the effects of laws, social arrangements,
and education upon human happiness and development.”17
Simply put, intelligence refers to the effective power or capacity to search for
and obtain adequate knowledge of actual and potential conditions so as to conduct
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oneself more effectively and efﬁciently. Dewey suggests that intelligence refers to the
“active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which
it tends.”18 More speciﬁcally, intelligence denotes a certain habit of mental attention
that brings the how and why of conduct into immediate focus through the light of
past experience. It is the inquiry into and identiﬁcation of the “con-sequence” of
ideas and facts for the purpose of judging the degree to which each grows out of and
supports the occurrence of the others. Social intelligence, then, refers to the power
of forming and judging the means and consequences of conduct on the growth of
shared habits and conditions. Fundamentally, social intelligence signiﬁes the social
control of conduct mediated through individual character.
A character guided by social intelligence strives to be more perceptive, reﬂective, and judicious about the effects of conduct on the equal consideration and just
development of all involved. This is to say, the problem of justice (again, the problem
of equalizing power) ﬁxes not only the end of social intelligence but its means as well.
To approach the problem of justice by way of social intelligence requires certain attitudes or traits of character and modes of approach. Gaining adequate knowledge
requires a skeptical attitude towards the surface or apparent meaning of facts. It requires an insistent desire for a range of facts and evidence and an openness of mind
to consider fully the signiﬁcance of facts as reported from as many different perspectives as possible. Thus, social intelligence entails a willingness to endure suspense and
uncertainty of outcome until enough facts have been identiﬁed and mined for their
concrete bearings. To act with social intelligence demands a tolerance or willingness
to attend to and face the reported meanings of facts with sincerity, no matter how in
congruent or conﬂicting these are with some particular interest. Furthermore, since
the problem of democratic justice demands the consideration of facts according to
the needs and claims of others, justice requires a character willing to seek out the
perspectives of others as indispensable resources for guidance.
As Dewey suggests, only by aiming to cultivate individuals guided by intelligence and sympathy can a democratic society thrive. “Only as the coming generation
learns in the schools to understand the social forces that are at work, the directions
and the cross-directions in which they are moving, the consequences that they are
reproducing, the consequences that they might produce if they were understood
and managed with intelligence—only as the schools provide this understanding,
have we any assurance that they are meeting the challenge which is put to them
by democracy.”19 The pedagogical implication that follows is that critical, democratic habits of mind can form and mature only as they are fed constantly through
practice. Thus, the only way to cultivate characters who will be actively engaged in
the challenge of democracy is to engage them in the concrete challenges of justice.
Therefore, a democratic education requires several important responsibilities of the
schools in terms of the conditions, methods, and content of instruction.
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School Context
First, the school must provide a context that ensures intellectual freedom and encourages shared inquiry, communication and deliberation. All those concerned with
public education must be involved and vigilant in detecting relations of power that,
intentionally or not, prevent, censor, or distort the freedom of inquiry, discussion,
and expression. However, the identiﬁcation of merely restrictive forms of power
is not enough. Dewey’s reminder that powerful groups have inﬂuenced shared institutions so as to condition others to accept, desire, and blindly act for ends antithetical to the growth of personal freedom should give a more critical edge to the
watchdog responsibilities of the public.20 The possibility that powerful ill-willed
individuals can—and, in fact, do—use the public schools to gain hegemonic control
over other people’s perspectives should make all concerned about a public education more wary and discriminating of the vested interests that permeate schools.
The increasing presence of marketing in public schools serves as an opportunity
for critical engagement about the intent and purpose of corporate involvement in
schools. What are the beneﬁts, what are the effects, how so, and for whom?
Of course, the relative effect and value of power are matters of judgment and,
therefore, matters to be contested and debated. This is to say that education necessarily is involved in the larger political discussion about what kind of community
should be in the making. It is immersed in the collective deliberation and struggle
over the effects of existing power on the growth of freedom, the types of associations
or powers that should be fostered, and the habits of character necessary to develop
these associations into conscious communities of good. A primary responsibility of
all those committed to a democratic education (especially administrators, teachers,
and parents) is to make sure that the school serves as the best example of democracy
in the political engagement about the direction of experience. This responsibility
entails making the school a citadel for the methods indispensable to a thriving cultural and political democracy. If schools are to produce active political citizens, the
atmosphere of the school must be saturated with a spirit of public participation and
civic courage. “It is idle to expect the schools to send out young men and women
who will stand actively and aggressively for the cause of free intelligence in meeting
social problems and attaining the goal of freedom unless the spirit of free intelligence
pervades the organization, administration, studies, and methods of the school itself.
. . . Eternal vigilance is the price of the conservation and extension of freedom, and
the schools should be the ceaseless guardians and creators of this vigilance.”21

Content and Methods of Instruction
As Dewey points out above, securing a context that is conducive to intellectual freedom is one element in the shaping of characters who are able to form ideas that are
socially relevant. Therefore, the second responsibility of the schools is to provide an
organized set of experiences that socially and politically engage students such that
critical, intelligent sympathy develops as a necessary habit of practice. Dewey’s 1922
criticism of public schools in terms of their instructional duties is worth quoting at
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length because it offers a timeless suggestion for what the general content and methods of democratic schools should be.
Our schooling does not educate, if by education be meant a trained habit
of discriminating inquiry and discriminating belief, the ability to look
beneath a ﬂoating surface to detect the conditions that ﬁx the contour
of the surface, and the forces which create its waves and drifts. . . . This
fact determines the fundamental criticism to be leveled against current
schooling, against what passes as an educational system. It not only does
little to make discriminating intelligence a safeguard against surrender to
the invasion of bunk, especially in its most dangerous form—social and
political bunk—but it does much to favor susceptibility to a welcoming
reception of it. There appear to be two chief causes for this ineptitude.
One is the persistence, in the body of what is taught, of traditional material which . . . affords no resource for discriminating insight, no protection
against being duped in facing the emergencies of today. . . . The other way
in which schooling fosters an undiscriminating gulping mental habit, eager to be duped, is positive. It consists in a systematic, almost deliberate,
avoidance of the spirit of criticism in dealing with history, politics, and
economics. There is an implicit belief that this avoidance is the only way
by which to produce good citizens. The more undiscriminating the history and institutions of one’s own nation are idealized, the greater is the
likelihood, so it is assumed, that the school product will be a loyal patriot, a
well-equipped good citizen. If the average boy and girl could be walled off
from all ideas and information about social affairs save those acquired in
school, they would enter upon the responsibilities of social membership in
complete ignorance that there are any social problems, any political evils,
any industrial defects. They would go forth with the supreme conﬁdence
that the way lies open to all, and that the sole cause of failure in business,
family life or citizenship lies in some personal deﬁciency in character. . . .
The effect is to send students out into actual life in a condition of acquired
and artiﬁcial innocence. Such perceptions as they may have of the realities of social struggles and problems they have derived incidentally, by the
way, and without the safeguards of intelligent acquaintance with facts
and impartially conducted discussion. It is no wonder that they are ripe
to be gulled, or that their attitude is one which merely perpetuates existing confusion, ignorance, prejudice, and credulity. Reaction from this
impossible naïve idealization of institutions as they are produces indifference and cynicism.22

To produce good citizens—that is, individuals who are sympathetic and
responsible for the direction of experience—requires supplying the concrete opportunities that will elicit these traits as genuine, active responses. It follows that
the subject matter of education can be nothing less than shared experience itself.
Since shared experience fundamentally consists of shared habits and practices, in
the most elemental sense the curricular and instructional responsibilities of the
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school must be to widen and enrich the students’ native interest in the social activities that compose their particular community of experience. This should be done
by enlisting their energies in trying out and undergoing a myriad of practices that
will enhance their natural sensitivity to and curiosity for what their community
life is like.
The importance of shared practices for curriculum and instruction cannot
be overstated. Shared practices develop in response to the particular problems and
demands of the social environment. Thus, they are the particular means to realize
speciﬁc consequences in experience. Again, as Dewey plainly states it, “Concrete
habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving,
and reasoning that is done.”23 They are the special powers by which to form and
regulate experience with efﬁciency and meaning. Furthermore, shared practices
are the forms of human association. They serve as the mechanisms by which to realize further connections with other forms of human activity and to understand
the intimate interactions between people that make community life possible and
important. Directly engaging students in the concrete activities of community life
provides the best stimulus to induce students to ﬁnd out what the special demands
and purposes of community life are. In turn, a developing sense of shared ends and
demands gives social purpose to the need to acquire special methods for gathering
facts and generating ideas and for developing special techniques and skills necessary to execute plans. A sense of shared ideals and demands gives reason for the
need to attend to and judge consequences more carefully and to modify plans in
light of their consequences. As Dewey suggests, “Things gain meaning when they
are used as means to bring about consequences (or as means to prevent the occurrence of undesired consequences), or as standing for consequences for which we
have to discover means. The relation of means-consequence is the centre and heart
of all understanding.”24 On the most elementary level, therefore, the school should
involve students in shared activities such that the means-consequence relation and
the inherent human responsibility for this relation become the constant integrating themes of their educational experience. The different content areas of the traditional curriculum represent the various ways of approaching this relation and
therefore represent the different ways of stating, analyzing, and understanding it.
It follows that all subsequent efforts in terms of instructional content and method
should bring the social signiﬁcance of the means-consequence relation to greater
degrees of consciousness. This is to say, the elementary development of attention
through shared practices has instructional signiﬁcance for engaging students to
take up the problem of democratic justice.
As pointed out above, shared practices are the particular means to speciﬁc
consequences in the social environment. When transferred into personal ability, shared practices are effective capacities, liberties, or, to put it in more relevant
terms, powers to act. Since liberties always produce social effects, liberties always
entail the social question of justice, the question of harmonious balance between
the capacities of one and the capacities of all. Directly engaging students in the
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means-consequence relation, which makes up the central nerve of shared practices,
furnishes the most direct mechanism by which students can develop an intimate
sensitivity to and personal responsibility for the problem of justice in its various
concrete manifestations.
The problem for instruction is selecting and arranging the experiences necessary to lead students to deﬁne the good of a particular activity and to develop a
sense of what expectations and demands should guide their consideration of consequences and means. By way of developing an idea of goods and standards, students
come to sense for themselves the special problems and conﬂicts intrinsic to a particular shared activity. That is, a developing interest in realizing a particular shared
good provides the prime condition for a heightened sensitivity and attention to the
ideas, beliefs, and relations that block or hinder the full satisfaction of the good. As
students are engaged in forming and measuring shared goods, they implicitly are
forming and judging powers and consequences, liberty and equality—justice. The
role of the teacher becomes that of suggesting and magnifying the social, economic,
and political implications of felt problems such that questions of justice serve explicitly as stimuli to call out and sharpen social intelligence as a response.
In the most basic sense, the role of the teacher is to serve as a resource for
suggestion and guidance. The instructional task, then, includes directing students
in bringing felt problems to a more acute, articulated focus by suggesting and supplying additional materials, accounts, and claims to be researched. This function
entails leading students into a careful study of the history of particular problems
to see what speciﬁc events and assumptions of meaning inform their manifestations. Thus, the teacher should serve as a model for sound habits of investigation.
This involves helping students search for and gather relevant facts and examine
and test the relations between facts so as to induce a clearer understanding of the
particular ideas of good and demands of right these facts embody or ignore. More
speciﬁcally in terms of power, the teacher carries the responsibility of making explicit the point that underlying ideas of good and right represent speciﬁc relations of
power, speciﬁc ideas of liberty or effective capacity, speciﬁc demands for increased
capacity, constrained capacity, or redistributed capacity. The job of the teacher is to
help students uncover and untangle the particular interests served by relations of
power as these are embedded in historical facts and have come to bear upon presently felt problems. Therefore, the more critical and political aspect of teaching
is directing students in identifying, deliberating about, and judging the effects of
power on the development of shared habits, desires, needs, and ways of judgment.
This task involves leading students in tracing and examining the particular means
used to legitimize one way of acting, one form of power, over another. Of course,
engaging students in these political tasks depends upon the creative ability to select
experiences that will lead students to identify problems extensive enough in social
scope so as to require them to seek out the perspectives of others, both historical
and current. Therefore, another responsibility of teaching is to help students build
a wider and more enriched forum of community experience.
Volume 22 (2) ♦ 2006

58

♦ Randall S. Hewitt
By use of the extensive nature of the problem of justice itself, the teacher must
lead students to see that only as they draw upon the lived experiences and stories
of others can they gather a range of facts and judgments necessary to bring particular injustices into adequate focus. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the teacher
to cultivate in students a strong sense that only as they seek out the perspectives of
others can they come to hear and feel a variety of living testaments of past events,
episodes, and effects of power. Mutual reference, in turn, should lend an emotional
charge and signiﬁcance to students’ intellectual search, particularly as they struggle
to identify and measure competing ideas of good and right. What students should
come to see is that free and open discussion serves as a vital means by which they
may become alert to subtle forms of exploitation that they had not yet taken into
account. An intimate exchange of perspective should serve as the indispensable
medium by which students come to confront the consequences of exploitation as
these are manifested in impulses, desires, and ways of judgment. Through mutual
conference students can come to help each other demystify hegemonic forms of
power as natural and outside of human change. Moreover, drawing upon the stories
of others should allow students to come to consciousness of past struggles of protest
and resistance. In turn, these past struggles should provide rich suggestions as to
how to form effective coalitions of resistance against current injustices and offer
insights about how to nourish more intimate associations with others. Therefore,
the teacher’s duty in this regard is to underscore the signiﬁcance of assembling a
tribunal of others that will act as an authoritative resource by which students can
come to test, correct, and sharpen their ideas of the good to be served and the responsibilities inherent in serving it.
The upshot of this discussion leads to a simple but indispensable educational
principle. As Dewey states it, “The only way to prepare for social life is to engage
in social life. To form habits of social usefulness and serviceableness apart from
any direct social need and motive, and apart from any existing social situation, is,
to the letter, teaching the child to swim by going through motions outside of the
water. The most indispensable condition is left out, and the results correspondingly futile.”25
It was asserted at the beginning of this paper that public education serves
as an instrument in the regulation of social and political sentiment required by
a capitalist system. The idea of self-development fostered in schools is reduced to
the goods, services, and images available for purchase. The moral life of citizenship in schools is one based upon the shared commitment to an economic system that promises ever higher standards of living and levels of consumption of
common goods. Democracy, the idea that individuals morally should be free and
equal in the pursuit of happiness as each sees ﬁt as long as this pursuit somehow
contributes to the well-being of others, then becomes bastardized to mean each
individual’s right and responsibility to pursue happiness deﬁned solely in terms of
material goods. This narrow conception of being in the world leads to the kind of
society Max Weber anticipated in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism:

E&C ♦ Education and Culture

Democratic Education: A Deweyan Reminder ♦ 59
a society characterized by “mechanized petriﬁcation, embellished with a sort of
convulsive self-importance,” one consisting of “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart.”26 Dewey’s conception of democracy and education entails an
understanding of self-development as wide, robust, and meaningful as the human
ability to feel, appreciate, and imagine the inﬁnite connections that we do and can
share with each other. Only as a more enchanting spirit of democracy is breathed
into our children through every aspect of their public school experience can we
hope that they will develop the souls necessary to transcend the “iron cage” that
Weber warned us about a century ago.
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